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TEST OF LOX COMPATIBILITY FOR ASPHALT
AND CONCRETE RUNWAY MATERIALS
by Clyde V. Moyers, Coleman J. Bryan, and Billy J. Lockhart
Kennedy Space Center
INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 1972, the Materials Testing Branch was requested to
investigate reactions between asphalt and concrete pavement and LOX (L0 2 ). The
investigation was conducted in three parts:
1. A literature survey was performed to learn what is available in published
reports of experiments and accidents. In addition, producers and users of L0 2 were
canvassed by telephone for possible unreported incidents.
2. Laboratory tests were conducted, using a standard LO2 impact test
apparatus.
3. Field experiments were performed, using 2-meter square slabs of asphalt
pavement covered with LO2 . Plummets and an explosive device were used as reaction
initiators.
A brief summary to this study has been published in the May 1973 issue of
the Fire Journal (Reference 1).
EVALUATION PROCEDURE AND RESULTS
Literature Survey
Apparently very few documented reports of accidents resulting from LO2 spills
on asphalt are available. In this survey, it was possible to obtain only one such report,
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an explosion in Rocketdyne's LOX storage area (Reference 2). Another article, describing
a general condition which may produce a hazardous environment, is reported in a Cryogenic
Safety Conference Proceedings (Reference 3). A third incident was mentioned without
reference to its source in a Safety Feature appearing in Industrial and Engineering
Chemistry (Reference 4). Also, see Appendix A.
The National Fire Protection Association Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems
at Consumer Sites, NFPA No. 50-1971, included the following: "Where oxygen is
stored as a liquid, noncombustible surfacing shall be provided in an area extending at
least 3 feet from points at ground level upon which any leakage of liquid oxygen might
fall during operation of the system and filling of a storage container. Such an area under
liquid delivery connections of mobile supply equipment shall be at least the full width
of the vehicle and at least 8 feet in the transverse direction.
NOTE 1: For purposes of this Standard, asphaltic or bitumastic paving is
considered to be combustible.
NOTE 2: The slope, if any, of such areas shall consider possible flow of
spilled liquid oxygen to adjacent combustible material."
Several individuals with the oxygen or associated industries were contacted by
telephone concerning reports of accidents involving LO 2 and asphalt. The following
are summaries of these contacts.
1. L. G. Matthews, Union Carbide Corporation, Linde Division, Tarrytown,
N. Y., has heard of several reactions, but knows of only verbal reports. He recalled a
possible incident involving North American on the West Coast several years ago, but
again he could not verify this.
2. W. L. Walls, NFPA, Boston, Mass., recalled only hearing about a
couple of incidents. He remembered hearing of one involving a fire truck driving over
pavement on which LO2 had been spilled, blowing a tire and fracturing a wheel; but,
again could not verify with a report or location.
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3. R. Watson, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburg, Pa., had not heard of any
accidents, but suggested that Air Products be contacted in reference to a safety
conference they sponsored in 1959.
4. W. L. Ball, Air Products and Chemical, Inc., Allentown, Pa., provided
information on the accident at Rocketdyne and the location of the Cryogenic Safety
reference.
5. J. J. Crowe, Air Reduction, Union, N. J., knew personally of no such
incidents.
6. L. H. Flanders, Factory Mutual Research Corporation, Boston, Mass.,
provided the reference in Industrial and Engineering Chemistry.
Laboratory Tests
Several LO2 impact compatibility tests were performed on asphalt and concrete
paving materials, by the procedure defined in MSFC SPEC-106-B. The first series of
tests evaluated both new and old asphalts in two different thicknesses (approximately
0.19 cm and 0.64 cm) at 10 kg-m. A high percentage of reactions was observed on
both the new and old materials; however, the more violent reactions occurred in the
thicker samples of old asphalt.
The second series of tests evaluated concrete in the same manner and no
reactions were observed.
The third series of tests was performed on old asphalt to establish a threshold
energy level. The material was found to be sensitive at impact energies even as low as
1 kg-mrn. After completing the third series of tests, another series of tests was
performed on the old asphalt and photographed to show intensity of some of the more
typical reactions. Results of the first three series of tests are shown in Table 1.
The final series of laboratory tests, using the same ABMA tester, evaluated
old asphalt under special conditions. The major difference between these and the pre-
vious tests were sample size and amount of LO2 used. The first sample, a 5-cm by
5-cm by 2 .5-cm piece of asphalt immersed in approximately 0.15 liter of L0 2 , yielded
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Table 1. Results of MSFC-SPEC-106-B LO2 Paving Materials Impact Tests
Energy Level - 10 kg-m
No. of No. of Type of
Materials Description Drops Reactions Reactions**
New Asphalt:
0.64 cm thick 20 18 7 faint
2 violent
3 slight
6 appreciable
New Asphalt:
several 0.19 cm specimens 20 19 8 faint
11 slight
Old Asphalt:
0.64 cm thick 20 20 6 appreciable
14 violent
Old Asphalt:
several 0.19 cm specimens 20 20 5 faint
15 slight
Concrete:
0.64 cm thick 20 0
Concrete:
several 0.19 cm specimens 20 0 - - -
Old Asphalt:
0.64 cm thick 3* 3 1 slight
1 appreciable
1 violent
*1 kg-m energy level
Faint - Barely visible light flash,
Slight - Light flash easily seen.
Appreciable - Intense light flash sometimes accompanied by audible report.
Violent - Very intense light flash accompanied by loud audible report.
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a violent reaction. The second sample, essentially a cube 7.5 cm on a side, failed to
react on the first drop; however, the test specimen broke into several pieces. Without
adding additional L0 2 or changing the sample, a second drop produced a very violent
reaction. The last sample, which was approximately 12 cm by 12 cm by 7.5 cm
(immersed in approximately 0.5 liter of L0 2 ) again failed to react on the first drop; but,
like the second specimen, it broke into several pieces. Again without changing the
sample, the plummet was dropped a second time. This time another violent reaction
occurred which threw a 5.89-kg stainless steel backup plate a couple of meters into
an aluminum door, and also damaged the plummet spider and four mounting studs (see
Figure 1). The test sample was blown into a large number of tiny pieces.
Field Experiments
First Trial, Impact. - A test stand, shown in Figure 2, was fabricated to
support four plummets, each held by a pin with a lanyard to permit remote individual
release. The plummets weighed 9.07 kg and were 7.5 cm in diameter. Tips, 1.27
cm in diameter and approximately 3.8 cm long, were screwed into the bottom of each
plummet. Each plummet was provided with a tube extending to within approximately
15 cm of the surface to be impacted. This prevented a plummet from falling over after
being dropped and interfering with the impact of subsequent plummets. A rod screwed
into the side of each plummet and extending through a vertical slot in each tube provided
a handle by which the plummet could be raised to the top of its tube to be secured by a
release pin. A slab of used asphalt pavement 2 meters square and approximately 5 cm
thick was installed at the test site and an asphalt curb 7.5 cm high was built around
its edge. The test stand was assembled over the slab with its feet level with the asphalt
surface. A ring of flex line, perforated on the bottom, was coupled to the L0 2 delivery
line and positioned over the middle of the slab. The slab was sponged dry to remove
rainwater, and then a trial flow of LN2 was performed. Three days later a 400 frame
per second movie camera was installed, rainwater was again sponged from the slab, and
12 empty 0.5 liter aluminum beer cans were placed as shown in Figure 3 as blast
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Figure 2. Impact Test Stand.
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Figure.3. Blast Sensor Location, Impact.
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sensors. The slab was then filled with L0 2 , which was allowed to flow for 10 minutes,
and the four plummets were then dropped in succession with no detectable reaction.
Second )Trial, Impact. - The tips were then removed from the plummets, a notch
was cut in the curb to reduce the L0 2 depth to 1.77 cm, and the test was repeated with
a 7.5-cm diameter impact area. No reaction was detected. It was found that the tips had
penetrated the slab during the four impacts of the first trial.
Third Trial, Detonation. - The holes and the notch were repaired, the test fix-
ture was removed, and rainwater was sponged from the slab. A No. 8 blasting cap with
15 cm of 21 gm per meter detonating cord was positioned on the slab. L0 2 was allowed
to flow for 10 minutes; then the cap was detonated. Some smoke and flame occurred, but
the reaction was confined to approximately a 2.5-cm depth of asphalt over an area of
approximately 0.09 m2. Some beer cans, which were positioned as shown in Figure 4,
had been overturned, but by the wind rather than the detonation. One can, No. 4, had
been burned, and another, No. 3, had been struck by a small object which scratched the
paint, but did not deform the can.
Fourth Trial, Impact. - A concrete slab, 1 meter square and 15 cm thick,
was then placed on the test site with its top surface at grade level. A slab of new
asphalt 2 meters square and a minimum of 10 cm thick was laid over the concrete, and
a 7.5-cm high asphalt curb was built around its edge. The following morning, after
sponging rainwater from the slab, L0 2 was allowed to flow for 10 minutes, and four
plummets with tips installed were dropped in succession without reaction. The tips had
penetrated the asphalt approximately 1.8 cm.
Fifth Trial, Impact. - A 15-cm long tip was then installed on the first plummet,
a 15-cm tip with the end ground to 0.6 cm in diameter was installed on the second plum-
met, and the four plummets were raised so that the tips would strike in the same locations
as before. LO2 was then allowed to flow for 4 minutes, and was terminated because of
a leak in a delivery valve. The slab was full and overflowing, however, and the four
plummets were dropped in succession, but no reaction occurred. It was estimated that
the tips had penetrated the asphalt an additional 0.6 cm.
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Figure 4. Blast Sensor Location, Blasting Cap.
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Sixth Trial, Impact. - The test stand was then removed, and a trench about
50 cm long, 10 cm wide, and 1.2 cm deep was chiseled in the asphalt. In the position
where the second plummet would strike, an additional cavity was excavated to accommo-
date a 2.5-cm thick aluminum block, 9 cm wide and 10 cm long. The block was firmly
seated with its top surface slightly below the level of the slab surface. A mixture of
broken old and new asphalt pavement, ranging from small pea size to large nut size, was
piled in the trench and tamped by foot. The pile was from 1 to 2 cm above the slab
surface. The test stand was then repositioned. No change was made in the plummet
tips, but a striker pin, consisting of a 1.2-cm threaded rod about 22 cm long, with a
7.5-cm teflon disc at the top was placed on the asphalt under the third plummet, with
the disc inside the tube to support it. Figure 5 shows the impact points prepared for
this trial. Beer cans were positioned as shown in Figure 2. L0 2 was allowed to flow
for 10 minutes, the camera switch was activated, and the first plummet was released,
with no reaction. The second plummet was then released, and a detonation occurred.
The test stand was destroyed, and it is estimated that pieces of it rose 30 meters in the
air. When the test site was inspected, it appeared that a reaction had occurred over the
entire slab surface, but only a small proportion of its material has been consumed to an
estimated depth of 2.5 cm. The reaction appeared to have initiated at two points, above
and below the aluminum block. The plummet tip impression in the aluminum block was
several times deeper than one made by simply dropping the plummet from the same height.
A cavity was found in the asphalt under the position occupied by the aluminum block. It
was found that the camera had not been actuated by the switch, and no film of the reaction
is available. Still photographs were made of the debris in situ. Figures 6 and 7 show
the impact site. In Figure 7, the outline of the asphalt slab can be seen. Fragments
have been assigned identification numbers 1 through 33. Figure 8 shows fragments 16,
17, and 18 at a distance of approximately 30 meters from the impact point. Figure 9
shows fragment 15, approximately 9 meters from the impact point. Figure 10 shows a
plummet, fragment 28, approximately 12 meters from the impact point. Figure 11 shows
a leg, fragment 22, approximately 47 meters from the impact point. Although the holding
pond was contaminated, two objects were retrieved from it: the first plummet, and the
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Figure 7. Impact Site, View from East.
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Figure 8. View to North. Fragments 16,
17, and 18.
Figure 9. View from Northeast.
* Fragment 15.
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SFigure 10. Plummet, Fragment 28.
711
Figure I11 Leg, Fragment 22.
aluminum block which had been placed under the second plummet. The block (a, Figure 12)
was approximately 18 meters at 920 from the impact point. The plummet was approximately
33 meters at 940 from the impact point. The fragments were then located, collected,
weighed, photographed, and plotted on a map. Figures 13 through 19 are photographs
made at that time showing representative fragments. Figure 20 is a map of the area,
showing the position of fragments after the detonation. Table 2 shows the weights,
distances, and azimuths for the fragments. In the last trial, three conditions were different
from those of the previous trials: first, the asphalt had dried out during a dry, warm week-
end before this trial, while all other trials had been made after wet slabs were sponged dry;
second, asphalt at the point of impact was broken, presenting a larger surface area; and
third, an aluminum block was placed beneath the broken asphalt at the point of impact.
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Figure 1. Aluminm Block
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Figure 13. Guide Tubes, Fragment 4.
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Figure 14. Flex Hose, Fragment 19.
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Figure 15. Leg, Fragment 21.
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Figure 16. Leg, Fragment 22.
22
Figure 17. Channel, Fragment 23.
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Figure 18. Aluminum Fragment 24.
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Figure 19. Asphalt Fragments.
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Figure 20. Map of Fragment Location
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Table 2. LOX/Asphalt Test Debris Location
Distance
From
Impact
Point Azimuth Weight
Item No. Debris Description (Meters) (Degrees) (Kilograms)
1. Blast Sensor Fragment 12.6 90.0
2. Guide Tube 12.7 143.0 6.03
3. Blast Sensors 6.7 157.5 - - -
4. 1 plummet, 2 guide tubes 6.1 172.5 21.93
5. Piece of Blast Sensor 2.6 180.0 - - -
6. Piece of Blast Sensor 7.3 244.0 -- -
7. Piece of Blast Sensor 0 - - -
8. Blast Sensor 5.8 304.0 -- -
9. Blast Sensor 4.8 332.5 - - -
10. Blast Sensor 7.4 354.5 - - -
11. Blast Sensor 6.4 9.0 - - -
12. Blast Sensor 4.2 9.0 - - -
13. Blast Sensor 7.6 27.5 -- -
14. Leg 8.0 5.5 6.35
15. Channel 19.7 32.5 4.76
16. End Frame 28.0 5.5 8.16
17. Leg 28.5 2.0 6.29
18. Guide Tube 30.6 2.0 5.89
19. Flex Hose 37.3 19.5 6.8
20. Blast Sensor 19.7 304.0 - - -
21. Leg 35.6 228.0 4.42
22. Leg 47.0 212.5 6.69
23. Channel 38.3 46.0 4.76
24. Part of Brace 48.5 21.0 3.17
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Table 2. LOX/Asphalt Test Debris Location (Continued)
Distance
From
Impact
Point Azimuth Weight
Item No. Debris Description (Meters) (Degrees) (Kilograms)
25. Aluminum Fragment 36.1 132.5 0.0028
26. Aluminum Fragment 15.5 109.0 - - -
27. Plummet 5.8 164.0 9.07
28. Plummet 12.1 18.0 9.07
29. Asphalt Fragment 7.1 166.5 0.54
30. Asphalt Fragment 7.9 284.0 0.023
31. Asphalt Fragment 9.5 353.0 0.034
32. Asphalt Fragment 13.0 32.0 0.028
33. Asphalt Fragment 13.9 102.5 0.018
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY OF HAZARDS OF HANDLING LIQUID OXYGEN
NOTE
The material in this Appendix was reprinted
from the "Industrial and Engineering Chemistry"
Journal, Volume 49, Number 9, dated
Sept. 1957, pages 81A and 82A. Copyright,
1957 by the American Chemical Society.
Reprinted by permission of the copyright owner.
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A WORKBOOK FEATURE
by C S. McCamy, National Bureau of Standards
Survey of Hazards of Handling Liquid Oxygen
With the Increased Industrial use of liquid oxygen, the importance of know-
ing about its compatibility with other materials is very much accented
Om nut International Tempera. likely if proper venting is not pro- such as polyvinyl chloride, poly.
ture Scale of 1948 (14), the vided. ethylene, or neoprene has been
boiling point of oxygen is, by defini- The properties of most materials recommended (10).
tion, -182.970* C., at a pressure of are altered considerably when they Violent boiling and splashing usu-
I standard atm. At a pressure of I are cooled from room temperature ally occur if liquid oxygen is poured
atm., liquid oxygen has a density of to the temperature of liquid oxygen into a container at or above room
1.14 grams per cm.' and a heat (1, 5, 10). This fact must be borne temperature or if any warm object is
capacity of 0.394 cal. per gram in mind in designing equipment for placed in contact with the liquid.
- o C. at a temperature just below storage and handling of liquid oxy-
the boiling point and a heat of vapor. gen. With few exceptions, ferrous Liquid Oxygen with Other Materials
ization of 50.9 cal. per gram (4). alloys are too brittle for use at these
Oxygen has a critical temperature of temperatures but the following metals The oxygen concentration, in
-118.8* C., critical pressure of 49.7 are reported to be usable at the weight per unit of volume, of 98%
atm., and a critical density of 0.430 temperature of liquid oxygen and are pure liquid oxygen is about 4000
granms per cm.' (8). listed in order of increasing brittle- times that in dry air at 200 C. and
On passing from the liquid state ness: pure nickel, monel, inconel, 760 mm. of mercury, therefore,
at the boiling point to the gaseous copper, aluminum, 18-8 low carbon oxidation reactions, once initiated,
state at 20* C. (both at a pressure of stainless steel, and annealed brass. proceed r.i very high rates in the
760 mm. of mercury), oxygen ex- The differences in thermal coeffi. presence of the liquid. Though it
pands to about 858 times the initial cients of expansion of materials may might seem that such a cold liquid
volume. If the material were con- give trouble where close dimensional would extinguish a burning match,
fined to the initial volume during this tolerances must be maintained. the actual effect of such a combina-
increase in temperature, the pres- Contact of the flesh with materials tion is deflagration of nearly explo-
sure would increase to about 2440 at the temperature of liquid oxygen sive violence (1). Finely divided
atm. (about 36,000 p.s.i.), as cal- for more than a few seconds can charcoal, saturated witih liquid oxy-
culated by the method of Hirsch- cause tissue damage similar to that gcn, is an explosive similar in many
felder and coworkers (6) on the basis produced by severe burns. Protec- respects to 40% nitroglycerine dyna-
of the critical constants given above. tive clothing made of asbestos or mite and is used as an industrial
Consequently, the rupture of liquid degreased chrome leather lined with explosive (3, 11, 15).
oxygen containers due to pressure is relatively impermeable materials Other materials that have been
VOL. 49, NO. * SPTIMBa tsr957 81 A
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used in this way are wood pulp, cot- sea level. Besides the precautions Tests have shown that the liquid-
ton, lamphlack, carbon black, vari- necessary to prevent the rupture of oxygen explosives in use in industry
ous chars, hydrocarbons, metal pow- containers due to pressure, it is were rather insensitive to ordinary
ders, sulfur, and coal dust (15). necessary to provide sufficient ven- electrostatic dbcharges and that the
Mixtures of any of these materials tilation in confined spaces to prevent discharge energy r':quired to con-
and liquid oxygen detonate so excessive concentration of gaseous stitute a hazard was considerably
readily that it seems likely that an oxygen. In general,. combustible greater than would ordinarily be
intimate mixture of liquid oxygen materials burn violently in an atmos- encountered-except where lightning
and almost any combustible material phere of oxygen. Materials, includ- or electric power line sparking is
might detonate under certain condi- ing metals, initially glowing or involved (15).
tions. The following incident illus- smoldering in air, burst into flame or All personnel required to handle
trates this point. brilliant candescence when intro- liquid oxygen should be trained by
A leak was reported to have de- duced into oxygen. Mixtures of someone experienced in this field
veloped in a pipe joint in a liquid flammable vapors or dusts with gase. and be closely supervised until safe
oxygen line and the liquid flowed ous oxygen may be explosive (15). practices are established.
onto an asphalt-paved surface di- Although the human body can Literature Cited
rectly below. When a workman tolerate rather wide variations in the (1) Claude, G., "Air Liquide, Oxygene,
attempting to repair the leak struck oxygen concentration in the atmos AMote," H. Dunod et E. Pinat,
the joint, the impact was trans- phere, prolonged exposure to an Paris, 1909.
mitted by the joint to the pavement atmosphere containing 80% or more (2) Coward, H. F., Jones, . W.,
"limits of Inflammability of Gases
below and the pavement detonated. of oxygen can induce a pneumonia and Vapors," U. S. Bur. Mines,
Among the materials considered (9). Bull. 279 (1938).(3) Denues, A. R. T., "Fire-retardantparticularly hazardous in the pres- Treatments of Liquid-oxygen Ex-
ence of liquid oxygen are sulfur, Ignltion losives," U. s. Bur. Mines,
hydrocarns, alcoho, ethers, fuels (1940).hydrocarbons, alcohols, ethers, fuels The prevention of ignition is a (4) Handbook of Chemistry and Physics,
of all kinds, oils, greases, wa~es, tars, matter of greatest importance where- Chemical Rubber Publ., Cleve-
land, Ohio, 1955-6.asphalt, starches, sugars, soaps, pow. ever liquid oxygen is handled. (S) Hardin, W. L., "Rise and Develop-dered metals, wood, cork, paper, tex- Friction in itself may be regarded ment of Liquefaction of Gases,"
tiles, rope, paints, and some plastics as a possible source of ignition where Macmillan, New York, 1899.
(1, 3, 5, 7, 10-13, 15). As liquid oxyg n contact w(6) Hirchfelder, J. 0., oters, "A Gen-oxygen in contact with ombueralized Equation of State for Both
oxygen is denser than water and tibles (15). A detonation was re- Gases and Liquids," University of
most liquid petroleum products, it ported to have occurred when a man Wisconsin Naval Research Labora.
ch m I ad boil poory, private communication.will sink in su aterials and boil walked across a gravelled surface on (7) Howell, S. P., Paul, J. V., Sherrick,
violently,- producing an intimate which liquid oxygen had been J. L.,"Progress of Investigations on
mixture. Porous materials may re- spilled. Ignition was attributed to uidr. xyen, Expch. Pape"r 2U. .
tain a large concentration of gaseous friction between, gravel and the (1923).
oxygen long after the liquid has asphalt beneath. (8) International Critical Tables, vol. I,
vaporized. The hazard repre- A large number of materials may p 202, McGraw-Hill, New York,
sented by a small sample of a given be placed in liquid oxygen for a few (9) Kartner, It. T., J. Expl. titd. 23, 149
material when soaked in liquid oxy- minutes and be d tonated by impact. (1916). Sa
gen does not appear to differ ap (10) National Safety Council, Chicago,ge s not appear to er ap On the basis of two experiments Ill., "liquid Oxygen," Data Shevt
preciably between samples soaked with a vegetable base fiberboard in D-283 (1955).
for 24 hours and those immersed for an adiabatic furnace at the National (It) Permirot, . S., Tolch, N. A., 'Liquid-
2 or 3 minutes. oxygen Explosives," U. S. Bur.Bureau of Standards, the rate of Mines, Bull. 349 (1932).
Thermal insulating materials for self-heating is not greatly affected by (12) Rice, G. S., "Development of Liquid.
use around oxygen containers must increased oxygen concentration in War,"n U. v. B ur. Minges, Tech.
be chosen with due regard for the the atmosphere at temperatures be- Paper 243 (1920).
hazard which would result from a low 2000 C., but above 200 ° C. the (13) Sloane, T. O., "Liquid Air and
lea. Inorganic materials such as .iquefaction of Gases," N. W.leak. i teri ls such as rate of self-heating was considerably Henley, New Yo, 1920.
glass wool or magnesium carbonate higher in the enriched atmosphere (14) Stiumon,H. F., J. Rstarch Natl. Bur.Standard 42, 209 (194 9).
may be usrd if they contain no flam- than it is in air. Materials con- ) Tournayds , 20 wer, F. (149).,
mable additives. Ordinarily, to taining unsaturated hydrocarbons Brown, F. V., "Safety and Per.
avoid the flammability hazard of should be considered particularly formance Characteritics of Liquid
paint, pipe lines carrying liquid oxy. hazardous in this respect. Heaters oxgen Explo ivn" U. S. Bur
rMines. Bull. 472 (1949).
gen are not painted and steam lines, which might not
otherwise be considered hazardous
Gaseous Oxygen ignition sources, might become so in
In the gaseous state, at 0* C. and the presence of an oxygen-rich
760 mm. of mercury, oxygen has a atmosphere.
density of 1.429 grams per liter. The lower limit of flammability of
Ox)gen constitutes about 21% by combustible gases generally occurs
volume or about 23,% by weight of at axbout the same concentration in
the earth's normal atmosphere at oxygen as in air (2).
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